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Continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocols over noisy channels
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A continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocol based on squeezed states and heterodyne
detection is introduced and shown to attain higher secret key rates over a noisy line than any
other one-way Gaussian protocol. This increased resistance to channel noise can be understood
as resulting from purposely adding noise to the signal that is converted into the secret key. This
notion of noise-enhanced tolerance to noise also provides a better physical insight into the poorly
understood discrepancies between the previously defined families of Gaussian protocols.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.a, 42.50.-p
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a prominent ap-
plication of quantum information sciences, enabling two
partners (Alice and Bob) to share a secret key, which in
turn allows them to communicate with full security. A
particular class of QKD protocols based on the Gaussian
modulation of Gaussian states has attracted much atten-
tion over the last years for its associated (homodyne or
heterodyne) detection scheme offers the prospect of very
high key rates [1]. In these so-called continuous-variable
(CV) protocols, the data which make the key are encoded
into continuous-spectrum quantum observables, namely
the quadrature components of a light field. These proto-
cols fall to date into three families, depending on which
states and detection schemes are used.
In the first one, Alice uses a source of squeezed states
that are randomly displaced along the squeezed quadra-
ture, while Bob performs homodyne detection [2]. The
experimental implementation is much simplified with the
second one, which is based at Alice’s side on coherent
states modulated in both quadratures instead of squeezed
states modulated along a single quadrature [3]. This
second proposal was first demonstrated experimentally
in Ref. [4], while its implementation with optical tele-
com components was reported in Ref. [5]. In the third
proposal, Alice still uses coherent states but Bob per-
forms heterodyne instead of homodyne detection, mea-
suring both quadratures together, hence eliminating the
need for an active random basis choice [6].
In this Letter, we introduce a fourth CV-QKD pro-
tocol based on squeezed states and heterodyne detection,
which, surprisingly, happens to outperform all previous
Gaussian protocols when the noise level in the quantum
channel is high. This hitherto overlooked protocol, com-
pleting the family of Gaussian protocols, had not been
found earlier because, at first sight, it serves no purpose
measuring both quadratures when only one of them (the
squeezed quadrature) carries the key. This striking effect
can, however, be understood by exploring the analogy
with qubit-based QKD and realizing that adding some
noise on the data of the appropriate partner during the
error correction phase may result in an increase of the
secret key rate [7]. We indeed can explain the improved
resistance to noise of our new protocol by using its equiv-
alence with the first protocol, based on squeezed states
and homodyne measurement, supplemented with noisy
post-processing. This analysis also allows us to construct
the family of optimal Gaussian protocols with respect to
channel excess noise.
It has been known after Ref. [7] that the performance
of qubit-based QKD protocols can be increased by having
Alice adding some noise to her data in the error correc-
tion phase. This additional classical noise makes the pro-
tocol more robust against noise in the quantum channel
because it is more detrimental to Eve than to Bob. More
precisely, for each quantum channel, there is an optimal
level of noise that Alice should add in order to maximize
the secret key rate. An explanation of this phenomena
can be found in Ref. [8] using an entanglement-based
description of BB84 together with a modified version
of Shor-Preskill’s unconditional security proof [9]. Note
that entangled-based CV-QKD protocols have also been
introduced in Ref. [10], but entanglement will only be
used in what follows as a tool to analyze all four prepare-
and-measure protocols on a same footing. We shall show
that this counterintuitive effect also appears, though in
disguise, in the case of CV-QKD protocols. This is not
straightforward, however, because of the distinction that
exists between direct reconciliation (DR) and reverse rec-
onciliation (RR), a feature which plays a central role in
CV-QKD. In contrast to qubit-based QKD, it is indeed
crucial to specify whether Alice or Bob is the reference
during the error correction post-processing phase. In DR,
Alice plays this role and the maximal achievable range is
known to be 3dB [3]; in RR, there is no theoretical limi-
tation to this range [4].
In the following, we will focus on the security of CV-
QKD against collective attacks, where Eve interacts in-
dividually with each signal pulse sent by Alice but ap-
plies a joint measurement at the end of the classical
post-processing stage. Studying this class of attacks is
sufficient to prove unconditional security of qubit-based
QKD protocols [11], and we take for granted here the
conjecture that the same holds for CV-QKD [12]. In
addition, we restrict our study to Gaussian collective at-
2tacks as they are known to be optimal [12]. Furthermore,
we consider RR as it works over longer distances. The
corollary is that Alice and Bob’s roles must be inter-
changed when analyzing the tolerance to noise (indeed,
qubit-based QKD uses DR). This leads us to introduce a
fourth Gaussian protocol.
The protocol. The first stage consists in quantum com-
munication over the quantum channel, characterized by
the transmittivity T and added noise variance referred
to the input χC . Alice generates a random bit r and a
real number a drawn from a Gaussian distribution G(a)
of variance Va. Subsequently, she generates a squeezed
vacuum state of covariance matrix diag(1/V, V ) and dis-
places it by an amount (a, 0), see Fig. 1. Before send-
ing the state together with the local oscillator through
the quantum channel, she applies a random dephasing of
θ = rπ/2 to the state. This dephasing is equivalent to
randomly choosing to squeeze and displace either the x or
p quadrature, as in Ref. [2]. Averaging the output states
over G(a) gives the same (thermal) state for r = 0 and
r = 1, which prevents Eve from extracting information
on which quadrature was selected by Alice. This imposes
the constraint Va+1/V = V on Alice’s modulation. The
quantum signal and local oscillator can be transmitted
over the same fiber by using a time multiplexing tech-
nique, as in Ref. [13]. At Bob’s station, the signal is first
demultiplexed and subsequently measured by a standard
heterodyne measurement, as shown in Fig. 1. The use
of heterodyning makes the random number generator on
Bob’s side unnecessary since there is no need to switch
between the measurements of conjugated bases, just as
in Ref. [6]. After repeating these steps many times, Al-
ice ends up with a long string of data a correlated with
Bob’s heterodyne data (bx, bp).
The second stage is the classical post-processing stage,
which serves extracting the secret key. It starts by Al-
ice revealing the string of random bits r encoding her
chosen quadratures and Bob keeping as his final string
of data b the measurements (bx or bp) matching Alice’s
choices. This step is followed by the channel estimation,
where Alice and Bob reveal a fraction of their data in
order to estimate T and χC , which allows them to bound
Eve’s information. Subsequently, Alice and Bob apply a
RR algorithm, such as LDPC codes [13] combined with
a discretization operation. This operation outputs two
perfectly correlated binary strings. Finally, both part-
ners apply a privacy amplification algorithm based, e.g.,
on hash functions [13], which produces a shared binary
secret key from their perfectly correlated data. As shown
in Ref. [7], the achievable RR secret key rate reads
K = I(a:b)− S(b:E), (1)
where I(a:b) is the Shannon information between Al-
ice and Bob’s data while S(b:E) is Eve’s information
on b given by the Holevo quantity S(b:E) = S(ρE) −∫
db p(b)S(ρbE). Given that Eve can be assumed to hold
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FIG. 1: Proposed experimental implementation of the new
protocol. The source (Alice) is based on a master laser beam.
A fraction of it is extracted to make the local oscillator (LO),
while the rest is converted into second harmonic in a non-
linear crystal (SHG). After spectral filtering (F1), the second
harmonic beam pumps an optical parametric amplifier (OPA)
which generates a squeezed vacuum state. Following the fil-
tering of the second harmonic (F2), this squeezed state is
displaced by a. This is done by mixing the state on a beam-
splitter of high transmittivity (THT ∼ 99% for BSHT ) with
a coherent state of intensity a2/(1 − THT ), extracted from
the LO. The attenuation (A) thus depends on a, which is dis-
tributed according to a Gaussian distribution G(a) of variance
Va. Before time multiplexing (M) the quantum signal with
the LO, Alice applies a phase shift θ = rπ/2 to it depend-
ing on the value of the random bit r. Then, the two com-
ponents of the time multiplexed signal travel to Bob through
the same fiber, thereby avoiding a spurious dephasing between
the signal and LO. At Bob’s station, the two components are
demultiplexed (M ′), and the quantum signal is heterodyne
measured. The latter measurement consists in splitting the
quantum signal (and LO) in two with the balanced beamsplit-
ters (BSB), and then homodyning each beam. The LO used
in the second measurement is dephased by π/2 in order to
measure the conjugate quadrature. Each homodyne detector
is composed of a balanced beam splitter and a pair of highly
efficient photodiodes; the difference of the photocurrents gives
the quadratures bx and bp.
the purification of the system and that Gaussian attacks
are optimal, we can directly compute K from the covari-
ance matrix γAB inferred from the channel estimation.
Tolerance to noise. In Fig. 2 a), we show that this
new protocol performs better than all previous RR pro-
tocols in term of tolerable excess noise, i.e., the lowest
ǫ = χC − (1− T )/T that gives a zero secret key rate. In
realistic implementations of CV-QKD, the excess noise
generally comes from the laser’s phase noise and imper-
fections in the modulation, as discussed in Ref. [5], so
that it can be considered as approximately independent
of the length of the fiber. This does not mean, however,
that the new protocol gives higher rates regardless of the
channel transmittivity. As shown in Fig. 2 b), it is only
for losses higher than a given threshold that it gives a
higher secret key rate than the protocol of Ref. [2].
In the new protocol, Bob disregards either bx or bp
during the post-processing stage, depending on Alice’s
quadrature choice r. This is equivalent to tracing out
the mode that is not used in Bob’s heterodyne measure-
ment, so that the new protocol can be viewed as a noisy
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FIG. 2: a) Tolerable excess noise ǫ (in shot-noise units) as
a function of the channel losses (in dB) for RR protocols:
new (solid line), squeezed states and homodyning (dashed
line) [2], coherent states and homodyning (dotted line) [3],
coherent states and heterodyning protocol (dash-dotted line)
[6]. The optimal protocol with Bob’s added noise χD is also
shown (crosses). The curves are plotted for V →∞. b) Secret
key rates as a function of the channel losses (in dB) for RR
protocols: new (solid line), squeezed states and homodyning
protocol (dashed line) [2]. The curves are plotted for an excess
noise ǫ = 0.5 and V = 40.
version of the protocol based on squeezed states and ho-
modyne measurement [2] where Bob inserts a balanced
beamsplitter before his measurement. The losses induced
by this beamsplitter translate into noise once Bob clas-
sically amplifies his outcome to match the initial signal.
Therefore, we have a clear demonstration that adding
noise that is not controlled by Eve on Bob’s side can be
beneficial in CV-QKD for a RR protocol.
Interestingly, this effect has a counterpart in DR which
remained unnoticed to date although it is visible with
known protocols. We indeed observe in Ref. [14] that the
homodyne protocol based on coherent states gives a bet-
ter tolerance to excess noise in DR than that based on
squeezed states. The reason is that the former protocol
[3] can actually be viewed as a noisy version of the latter
protocol [2], where the noise is now added by the same
mechanism but on Alice’s side in the entanglement-based
equivalent scheme, see Fig. 3. In this scheme, coher-
ent states are prepared by Alice applying an heterodyne
measurement, which can be viewed as a noisy homodyne
measurement. We thus conclude that there is a benefi-
cial effect of noise if added on the reference side of error
correction (Alice in DR and Bob in RR). Clearly, adding
noise on the other side is always detrimental as it de-
creases the information between the authorized parties
without affecting the eavesdropper’s information.
Optimal protocol. We now generalize the above new
RR protocol to optimally resist against an arbitrary
channel noise. In Figure 3, we exhibit an entanglement-
based description of CV-QKD protocols, where Bob
replaces his heterodyne measurement by an ideal ho-
modyne measurement preceeded by a general Gaussian
phase-insensitive added noise. This models the follow-
ΤBEPR
V
A
EPR
N G
Alice Bob
B
F
Eve
E
Τ, χc ba
FIG. 3: Entanglement-based description of the protocol with
general Gaussian added noise on Bob’s side. The source of
squeezed states on Alice’s side is replaced by an entangled
pair (EPR) of variance V , followed by an homodyne mea-
surement of mode A. The other mode is sent to Bob through
the quantum channel. Before Bob’s homodyne detection, the
state received by Bob is mixed with a thermal state (half of an
EPR pair) of variance N on a beamsplitter of transmittivity
TB(χD = (1− TB)N/TB).
ing physical situations: i) inefficient homodyne detec-
tion with efficiency TB and electronic noise variance
v = (1 − TB)(N − 1); ii) perfect homodyne detection
followed by a classical Gaussian added noise of variance
χD = (1 − TB)N/TB; iii) any combination of the pre-
vious cases giving the same χD. The secret key rate
can be calculated using the following technique. First
we use the fact that Eve’s system E purifies AB, that
is, S(E) = S(AB). Secondly, after Bob’s projective
measurement yielding b, the system AEFG being pure,
we have S(E|b) = S(AFG|b). For Gaussian states
S(AFG|b) is the same for all b’s, being just a function of
the covariance matrix γAB. Thus, we obtain,
K = I(a:b)− S(AB) + S(AFG|b) (2)
which can be calculated from the covariance matrix
γAB =
[
xI zσ
zσ yI
]
, (3)
where x = V , y = T (V + χC), z =
√
T (V 2 − 1), I =
diag(1, 1) and σ = diag(1,−1). The information between
Alice and Bob reads
I(a:b) =
1
2
log
[
V + χ
χ+ 1/V
]
, (4)
where χ = χC+χD/T . Then, S(AB) is a function of the
symplectic eigenvalues λ1,2 of γAB which reads
S(AB) = G
[
(λ1 − 1)/2
]
+G
[
(λ2 − 1)/2
]
, (5)
where G(x) = (x+1) log(x+1)− x log x is the von Neu-
mann entropy of a thermal state and
λ21,2 =
1
2
[
∆±
√
∆2 − 4D2
]
. (6)
Here, we have used the notation ∆ = x2 + y2 − 2z2 and
D = xy − z2. Finally, S(AFG|b) is a function of the
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FIG. 4: a) Optimal secret key rates as a function of the chan-
nel losses (dB) for a fixed excess noise ǫ = 0.5 (solid line)
compared to the protocol based on squeezed states and ho-
modyning [2] (dotted line) and the new protocol proposed in
this Letter (dashed line). b) Optimal choice of χD (in shot-
noise units) that maximizes the secret key rate. The curves
are plotted for V = 40.
symplectic eigenvalues λ3,4 similar to (5) where λ
2
3,4 are
solutions of the second order polynomial λ4−Aλ2+B = 0
with
A =
1
y + χD
[
y + xD + χD∆
]
(7)
B =
D
y + χD
[
x+ χDD
]
. (8)
By tuning Bob’s added noise χD, it is possible to maxi-
mize the secret key rate, as shown in Fig. 4. More impor-
tantly, the resulting family of optimal protocols exhibits
the highest tolerance to noise among all Gaussian CV-
QKD protocols, as demonstrated in Fig. 2 a) (crosses).
Note that although Bob’s heterodyne measurement is
useful to get an insight on this enhanced tolerance to
noise, Bob eventually disregards one of the two quadra-
tures in the actual protocol. Thus, up to a factor of two in
the key rate, he may as well apply a (noisy) homodyne
measurement and keep the outcome only when he has
measured the right quadrature. Finally, instead of using
a random numbers generator to generate the noise χD, it
is certainly more interesting for Bob to do it physically
by tuning the efficiency of his detector.
Conclusion. We have proposed a new CV-QKD pro-
tocol using squeezed states and heterodyne detection,
which outperforms all known Gaussian protocols in terms
of resistance to noise. This enhanced robustness can be
interpreted as the continuous-variable counterpart of the
effect, first described in Ref. [7], that adding noise in
the error-correction post-processing phase may increase
the secret key rate of one-way qubit-based protocols.
Then, we have studied the impact of a general Gaussian
phase-insensitive noise on the secret key rate, and have
shown that for each quantum channel (characterized by
its transmittivity T and added noise variance χC), there
is an optimal noise χD that Bob must add to maximize
the secret key rate. The resulting protocol also exhibits
the highest resistance to noise among all Gaussian pro-
tocols. This noise-enhanced tolerance to noise is par-
ticularly interesting for reverse-reconciliation CV-QKD
protocols, which work over larger distances, but, inter-
estingly, it also has an analogue for direct-reconciliation
protocols. This gives a physical explanation to the previ-
ously observed – but poorly understood – discrepancies
between the efficiencies of Gaussian protocols.
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